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Abstract: 
This paper empirically tests a theory laid out in Scholes et al. (2015, p. 315) that the U.S. 
worldwide tax system reduces the incentive of U.S. parent companies to be tax aggressive in 
their foreign subsidiaries. Investors subject to a worldwide tax system pay taxes on their 
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percentage point higher average GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) compared to subsidiaries owned 
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1 Introduction 
It is well documented that multinationals shift income across jurisdictions (Dischinger 
and Riedel 2011; Dyreng and Lindsey 2009; Klassen and Laplante 2012; Newberry and Dhaliwal 
2001, among others). Markle (2016) shows that parent companies subject to worldwide tax 
systems shift income to a lesser extent than parent companies subject to territorial systems. 
Under a worldwide system with deferral (as implemented in the United States), firms pay taxes 
on their worldwide income when dividends are repatriated regardless of the origin thereof, 
whereas countries with a territorial system exempt foreign-source income from taxation.1 To 
avoid double taxation, tax authorities in worldwide tax systems grant a credit for taxes paid in a 
foreign jurisdiction (foreign tax credit). Less income shifting by parent companies subject to 
worldwide tax systems can be interpreted as being less tax aggressive across jurisdictions. 
However, the reduced incentive to be less tax aggressive across jurisdictions, as documented by 
Markle (2016), is not the only incentive arising from worldwide tax systems.  
We test whether U.S. multinationals are less tax aggressive within jurisdictions where 
their foreign subsidiaries are located, when the statutory tax rate in a subsidiary’s home country 
is lower than the U.S. statutory tax rate. This theory was laid out in Scholes et al. (2015, p. 315). 
The rationale is that a U.S. investor pays the difference between the tax payment abroad and the 
U.S. statutory tax rate when profits are repatriated, whereas investors located in countries with 
territorial tax systems gain the full tax savings from being tax aggressive abroad. Thus, the 
benefit of tax aggressiveness of foreign U.S.-owned subsidiaries is absent or reduced. We focus 
                                                          
1 Some countries technically apply a worldwide system, but are usually classified as applying a territorial system, as 
the majority of foreign dividends are exempted from taxation (e.g. Germany taxes 5% of foreign dividends at the 
statutory tax rate).  
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our analyses on U.S.-owned foreign subsidiaries, as, currently, the United States is the only 
member of the G8 that has a worldwide tax system.  
Our research question implies that we focus on the tax positions taken by multinationals’ 
foreign affiliates. Thus, we are interested in differences in the tax aggressiveness of foreign 
affiliates. Tax aggressiveness is a broad concept that is influenced by international tax 
minimization strategies, such as income shifting, and by pursuing domestic tax minimization 
strategies, such as claiming bonus depreciation or choosing a domestic location for a foreign 
affiliate that minimizes regional taxes and surcharges. While there is no doubt that multinationals 
shift income to jurisdictions with low tax rates, all income (including the shifted income) will 
eventually be taxed, although the tax rate in tax havens might be close to zero. However, due to 
constraints on income shifting (e.g. the arm’s length principle, CFC rules), most foreign 
subsidiaries still pay tax in the jurisdiction where they are located, and anecdotal evidence of 
multinationals not paying any taxes is rather the exception than the rule.2 Thus, we investigate 
whether multinationals’ foreign subsidiaries have different outcomes of tax aggressiveness 
incentivized by their parents’ being subject to either a worldwide tax system or a territorial tax 
system. We choose GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs) as our measure to quantify ex post the 
extent of aggressive tax positions taken by foreign affiliates.3  
It is not obvious that U.S. multinationals are less tax aggressive in their foreign 
subsidiaries because the U.S. worldwide tax system offers the possibility to defer additional 
home country taxation until dividends are repatriated. There is a political debate as to whether 
                                                          
2 Dyreng, Lindsey, Markle, and Shackelford (2015) show that tax considerations affect the location of foreign equity 
affiliates, as firms minimize the tax burden along the equity supply chain. The authors argue that firms would not 
bear the additional costs associated with setting up tax-efficient equity supply chains if profit shifting were as 
effective as indicated by anecdotal evidence in the press (Dyreng et al. 2015). In line with that, we observe that U.S.-
owned subsidiaries are slightly more profitable than German firms without the possibility to shift income across 
jurisdictions (German stand-alone firms). 
3 We cannot use cash effective tax rates, as European firms are not required to publish cash flow statements for their 
unconsolidated statements. 
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U.S. multinationals act as if they were subject to a territorial system because there is the 
possibility to defer taxation until repatriation, and in that way multinationals can wait for another 
tax holiday to circumvent repatriation taxes. Recent media attention on tax avoidance strategies 
of, for example, Apple, Amazon, Google, and Starbucks which build up large amounts of cash 
overseas, corroborates the notion that multinationals do not intend to repatriate unless another tax 
holiday arises.4 For these highly profitable multinationals this is a superior strategy, as their costs 
of issuing debt to refinance their activities within the United States are historically low – and 
lower than the repatriation taxes (Dyreng and Markle 2015). This suggests that we should not be 
able to see any (or at least only very small) differences in the tax aggressiveness of U.S.- and 
non-U.S.-owned subsidiaries.  
To study whether U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less tax aggressive than other foreign 
subsidiaries, we use unconsolidated financial statements of European private firms owned by 
foreign shareholders. We start with a detailed analysis of U.S.-owned subsidiaries in Germany,5 
and our results suggest that subsidiaries of U.S. investors have approximately a 1.2 percentage 
point higher average GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) compared to subsidiaries of foreign 
investors located in countries with a territorial system. Furthermore, the higher ETR is driven by 
subsidiaries where both the ultimate and the immediate parent are incorporated in the United 
States.  
We verify that the German finding holds in other European countries. In a sample of 
seven European countries with sufficient data and tax burden (domestic statutory tax rate plus 
                                                          
4 In line with that, U.S. multinationals use the locked-out cash for foreign acquisitions that are not necessarily value-
enhancing (Hanlon, Lester, and Verdi 2015; Edwards, Kravet, and Wilson 2016). 
5 Choosing Germany as our main setting is particularly useful as (i) there is a high book-tax alignment for 
unconsolidated financial statements, (ii) Germany is not considered a tax haven, (iii) private firm data with a high 
degree of detail are available, and (iv) U.S. investors (worldwide tax system) face a higher domestic tax rate than the 
German effective tax rate. 
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withholding tax according to income tax treaties) below the U.S. statutory tax rate of 35% 
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden), we find in each country that 
U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less tax aggressive compared to other foreign subsidiaries.  
Belgium, France, Norway, and Spain have a statutory tax burden for U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries exceeding the U.S. statutory tax rate. In this case, U.S.-owned subsidiaries are 
expected to be less tax aggressive only if their average foreign effective tax rate exceeds the U.S. 
statutory tax rate, as the U.S. tax system features an overall limitation on the foreign tax credit. 
However, U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less likely to pay additional taxes upon repatriation in 
these countries, and we expect to find U.S.-owned subsidiaries to be  as tax aggressive as other 
foreign-owned subsidiaries. In fact, we find in two countries (Belgium and France) that U.S. 
investors are as tax aggressive as all other investors. In Norway and Spain, we find the same 
results as in the countries with a statutory tax rate below 35%. This indicates that, on average, 
U.S. parents investing in Belgium and France have an average foreign effective tax rate 
exceeding 35%.  
Next, we investigate U.S. parent companies that have investments in Belgium and/or 
France (>35%) and an investment in a country with a statutory tax rate below 35%. For these 
multinationals, the average foreign tax rate is likely to be below 35%, and we find that 
subsidiaries owned by these U.S. investors are less tax aggressive in Belgium and France than 
subsidiaries owned by other foreign investors. Conversely, when U.S. investors have a subsidiary 
only in Belgium or France, they are statistically significantly more tax aggressive. Thus, U.S. 
investors respond to their foreign average effective tax rate – which is in line with the overall 
limitation on foreign tax credits under the U.S. worldwide tax system.  
In further results and robustness tests, we find similar results for subsidiaries from the 
United Kingdom and Japan prior 2009 when both countries had a worldwide tax system in place. 
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Furthermore, we show that the results are not affected by different thresholds for the definition of 
a foreign U.S. subsidiary (e.g. 75% instead of 100% ownership), the use of long-run ETRs, 
characteristics of the parent companies, the existence of tax-loss carryforwards, or when we 
compare U.S.-owned subsidiaries only to Canadian-owned subsidiaries.  
Our results are economically meaningful. The “excess” tax payments of U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries account, on average, for a reduction in return on equity of 0.5 percentage points per 
annum, neglecting potential costs of tax aggressiveness. Thus, U.S. investments into foreign 
subsidiaries are disadvantaged compared to investments from countries with a territorial tax 
system. We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, our results suggest that the tax system 
to which the parent company is subject and its interplay with foreign tax systems shapes tax-
relevant decisions of multinationals and their subsidiaries. In line with the theory provided by 
Scholes et al. (2015), we show that a worldwide tax system not only affects income shifting 
(Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers 2012; Markle 2016), but also provides incentives for those 
subsidiaries operating abroad to be less tax aggressive.  
Second, our findings contradict the assertions seen in the political debate that U.S. 
multinationals act as if they were in a territorial system because they can defer home country 
taxation by declaring profits earned abroad as permanently reinvested. If this were the case, 
subsidiaries with U.S. investors should be as tax aggressive as subsidiaries with investors from 
any other country. 
Finally, our paper contributes to the academic, political, and public media discussion 
revolving around the costs and benefits of a worldwide versus territorial tax system. On the one 
hand, some studies document benefits of a worldwide tax system, such as decreased incidence of 
income shifting across jurisdictions (Atwood et al. 2012; Markle 2016). On the other hand, the 
worldwide tax system with deferral triggered unintended consequences since multinationals 
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accumulate large amounts of cash overseas waiting for being repatriated when another U.S. tax 
holiday comes (Fleischer 2012; Kocieniewski 2011; Linebaugh 2012). We show that U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries are less tax aggressive within jurisdictions as indicated by higher ETRs in foreign 
jurisdiction. In turn this reduces the amount the U.S. tax authority gains when profits are 
repatriated. Thus, the reduced tax aggressiveness of subsidiaries is a windfall profit for the tax 
authorities of the subsidiary’s home country.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional setting and 
develops the hypothesis. Section 3 (4) explains the research design and findings on the German 
(European) sample and section 5 contains robustness tests and further results. Section 6 
concludes. 
2 Institutional Setting and Hypothesis Development 
In cross-border economic activities, three layers of taxation apply to the profit transfer 
from a foreign subsidiary to a parent company. First, the foreign country levies corporate income 
tax on the profit of the subsidiary (tsub). Second, in case that the subsidiary distributes dividends, 
the foreign tax authority levies withholding taxes on the dividend distribution (twth). Third, the 
home country of the parent can tax the dividends and grants a credit for taxes paid abroad 
(worldwide system, tpar) or exempts the dividends from tax (territorial system). Thus, in case that 
a worldwide country grants a credit for the taxes paid by the subsidiary and the withholding 
taxes, the tax burden is characterized by the following expression: 
max⁡{𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑏 + (1 − 𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑏) ∗ 𝑡𝑤𝑡ℎ⁡; 𝑡𝑝𝑎𝑟}.⁡      (1) 
In case of a territorial system the tax burden on dividend distributions amounts to:  
 𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑏 + (1 − 𝑡𝑠𝑢𝑏) ∗ 𝑡𝑤𝑡ℎ.       (2) 
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As can be seen from the two equations, the tax burden of the two alternatives differs 
when the tax rate in the parent’s home country is higher than the corporate income tax rate in the 
subsidiary’s home country plus withholding tax on dividend distributions. In this case, additional 
home country taxation occurs when dividends are repatriated which provides a disincentive to 
repatriate profits earned abroad. This is often the case if a firm is owned by U.S. investors since 
(i) the U.S. is the only G8 member with a worldwide tax system and (ii) the U.S. statutory tax 
rate of 35% is higher than tax rates in most other countries.  
A few studies address the impact of foreign tax credits on multinationals’ behavior. 
Collins and Shackelford (1992) find that more stringent foreign tax credit limitations and interest 
allocation rules after the Tax Reform Act 1986 are associated with more preferred stock for U.S. 
multinationals. Collins, Kemsley, and Lang (1998) investigate income shifting behavior of U.S. 
multinationals in response to the average tax rates these multinationals face abroad. While their 
results indicate that there is little evidence of income shifting out of the U.S., they find that 
multinationals with average foreign tax rates exceeding the U.S. tax rate shift approximately $25-
30 million of income per company into the U.S. per year. 
The U.S. worldwide tax system defers taxation of foreign profits until repatriation and the 
concept of permanently reinvested earnings allows for not recognizing deferred tax liabilities for 
financial accounting purposes. Thus, foreign tax credits are only applicable if a U.S. 
multinational’s subsidiary abroad distributes dividends. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2007) identify 
taxation of dividend income, domestic financing and investment needs, and agency problems as 
the three factors that shape dividend policy within the multinational firm. The U.S. worldwide 
tax system with a high corporate income tax provides an incentive not to repatriate dividends. 
The incentive increases if firms are less financially constrained and more technology intensive 
(Albring, Mills, and Newberry 2011; Foley, Hartzell, and Titman 2007). Another consequence is 
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high cash holdings abroad of U.S. multinationals. Hanlon et al. (2015) show that locked-out cash 
is associated with foreign acquisitions.  
Blouin and Krull (2009) document that in case of no or low tax costs associated with 
dividend repatriation, multinationals with lower investment opportunities and higher free cash 
flows repatriate dividends. The repatriating multinationals use the cash for share repurchases. 
Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin (2010) report that more than 60% of the funds repatriated at the 
reduced rate introduced by the American Jobs Creation Act 2004 were obtained from cash 
holdings abroad. Dharmapala, Foley, and Forbes (2011) suggest that the increased repatriations 
are only associated with additional shareholder payouts for multinationals with strong corporate 
governance. Finally, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2001) compare incorporated and non-incorporated 
affiliates. Their results suggest that aggregate dividend payouts would increase by 12.8% if the 
U.S. adopted a territorial tax system. Summing up, the literature so far is concerned with 
dividend policies within multinational groups but not with impact of the worldwide tax system in 
the parent’s home country on the tax planning behavior of the subsidiaries operating abroad. We 
aim at closing this gap by comparing U.S.-owned subsidiaries with subsidiaries owned by 
investors from other countries.  
Because of the worldwide tax system and the high U.S. tax rate we argue that U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries are less tax aggressive than subsidiaries from countries with a territorial system. The 
rationale for this is that if U.S. investors repatriate foreign earnings, they will pay the higher U.S. 
tax rate eventually.6 Generally, the decision to engage in aggressive tax strategies depends on the 
                                                          
6 As the United States applies an overall limitation, the foreign tax credit rules allow a balancing of profits obtained 
from countries with higher and lower tax rates than the U.S. tax rate. Thus, the weighted average tax rate of all 
foreign operations is relevant to determine whether a U.S.-owned subsidiary is supposed to be less tax aggressive 
than non U.S.-owned subsidiaries. The above-described scenario, however, is applicable only to active income. 
Passive income (e.g. from rental activities or businesses in which the taxpayer does not materially participate) can be 
balanced only with other passive income. 
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costs and benefits for the involved parties. Tax savings lead to rent extraction for shareholders 
and to higher salaries/bonuses for managers if the interests of both groups are aligned. Whereas 
the benefits are obvious, the costs of tax avoidance can be direct or indirect. Direct costs are, for 
example, the costs of establishing complex tax structures within the group, as well as payments 
for tax advisors. Indirect costs are, for example, the increased likelihood of sanctions from the 
tax authorities and reputational costs. Assuming that multinationals have scarce resources and the 
benefit of tax aggressiveness of subsidiaries owned by U.S. investors is reduced, these investors 
might have fewer incentives to avoid taxes in the foreign subsidiary. However, the U.S. 
worldwide tax system offers the possibility to defer additional home country taxation until 
dividends are repatriated and in that way multinationals can wait for another tax holiday to 
circumvent repatriation taxes. Thus, it is an empirical question as to whether U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries are less tax aggressive. We state our hypothesis as follows.  
H: U.S.-owned subsidiaries abroad are less tax aggressive than subsidiaries 
owned by investors from a country with a territorial system if the U.S. tax rate is 
above the foreign tax rate.  
3 German Sample 
Sample and Research Design 
In theory, the average tax rate of all foreign operations is the correct comparison for the 
U.S. tax rate to decide upon being tax aggressive abroad. However, given the tax rate cuts in 
many countries, it is unlikely that U.S. multinationals face weighted average tax rates over all 
their foreign activities above the U.S. statutory tax rate. Thus, we are confident that a country by 
country analysis is feasible even though the U.S. foreign tax credit is computed using the overall 
limitation.  
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Data is gathered from Hoppenstedt and Orbis. We obtain financial statement data from 
the Hoppenstedt Database and shareholder data from the Orbis Database. As the data sets 
available to the authors do not have a common identifier, we match both data sets using the 
German Commercial Register Number (GCRN).  
We use German unconsolidated financial statements until 2009, as private firm data are 
available and Germany features a high book-tax alignment for that time period (Pfaff and 
Schröer 1996). In 2010, new German GAAP was introduced and the book-tax conformity was 
reduced. We do not include data before 2005 since there is no shareholder information available 
to us. Thus, our sample period is 2005 – 2009.7 Although there was a tax cut in Germany 
effective in 2008, the average effective tax rate of the sample is below 35% in all years. 
We limit the shareholder data to shareholdings from corporations. We delete subsidiaries 
with negative pretax income in order to calculate the effective tax rates. Furthermore, we delete 
observations with missing data on total assets, net income, and tax expense. The final sample 
consists of 4,199 firm-year observations of subsidiaries that are wholly-owned by foreign 
investors.  
In Germany, unconsolidated statements are the basis for determining taxable profit. Thus, 
the unconsolidated financial statement captures the income generated in Germany that will be 
taxed by the tax authorities. However, differences between financial accounting and tax 
accounting arise from specific tax rules (Pfaff and Schröer 1996). Tax avoiding strategies are, for 
example, choosing the location of a subsidiary within Germany such that regionally variant taxes 
(local business taxes) are minimized, and minimizing non-tax deductible expenses. While it is 
hard to say which strategies the subsidiaries in our sample actually apply, tax audit statistics 
                                                          
7 Some missing shareholder-years were filled with information from the previous year. For example, if we observe 
the same shareholder in 2007 and in 2009, while 2008 is missing, we assume that the shareholder in 2008 is the same 
as in 2007. Thus, as soon as shareholder data are updated, we use the updated data. 
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published by the German Federal Ministry of Finance show that additional tax revenue of around 
€17.2 billion was raised in 2013 due to tax audits. This suggests that German firms take some 
aggressive tax positions which are not approved by the tax authorities. Therefore, our measure of 
tax aggressiveness is the result of all tax minimization strategies taken by the foreign subsidiary 
within the respective jurisdiction and thus a measure of the subsidiaries’ tax aggressiveness. We 
cannot use cash-based tax avoidance measures, as European firms are not required to publish 
cash flow statements for their unconsolidated statements. Therefore, the effective tax rate is then 
computed as income tax plus deferred tax deflated by pretax income.8 
ETR = (Income Tax + Deferred Tax) / PRETAX (3) 
The dependent variable is ETR and our main variable of interest is an indicator variable 
that takes on the value of one if a subsidiary is wholly owned by U.S. shareholders (US100). 
Furthermore, the models use the following control variables: return on assets (ROA), debt ratio 
(DEBT), intangible assets (INTANG), size measured as the logarithm of total assets (SIZE), the 
ratio of property, plant and equipment over total assets (PPE), and BIG5 is coded one if the 
respective company is audited by one of the five top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, 
KPMG, PWC).9 We do not control for application of International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) since German firms are required to use local GAAP for the unconsolidated statements.10  
                                                          
8 The German tax authorities make certain amendments to the profits of the unconsolidated statement. One of the 
most significant is that only 5% of the dividends are subject to taxation. Furthermore, the depreciation of shares in 
affiliated companies is not tax-deductible. To make sure that our measure of tax avoidance picks up tax planning and 
is not predominantly driven by systematic differences that result in permanent book-tax differences by default, we 
correct for both positions. Furthermore, ETRs are a meaningful measure of tax avoidance, only if the denominator is 
derived from financial accounting. If the denominator were the “true” taxable income, the effective tax rate would 
equal the statutory tax rate. Thus, we do not aim at computing the true taxable income, but correct only for positions 
which by default create permanent differences between financial and tax accounting, and thus cannot be classified as 
tax planning. 
9 In addition to the BIG4 auditing companies, BDO is often considered as among the top auditors in Germany.  
10 De Simone (2016) shows that the introduction of IFRS for unconsolidated statements in some European countries 
affected tax-motivated income shifting.  
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Panel A of Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics of our sample. 12.8% of the sample 
is wholly-owned by U.S. investors (537 firm-year observations). The average tax rate is 31%. 
Approximately 20% of the sample is audited by one of the Big5 auditing firms. As the sample is 
limited to subsidiaries with pretax profits in order to compute tax rates, subsidiaries are on 
average highly profitable. The average return on assets is 9.6%. Property, plant and equipment 
account on average for 16.0% of total assets and intangible assets amount on average to 
approximately 2%. Panel B and Panel C contain the descriptive statistics separately for U.S.- and 
non-U.S.-owned subsidiaries. In line with our hypothesis, the average tax rate of U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries is higher than the average tax rate of the control sample (31.7% vs. 30.8%). Pearson 
and Spearman correlations are shown in Table 2. US100 is positively but statistically 
insignificantly correlated with ETR. ETR is significantly negatively correlated with profitability 
(ROA).  
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here 
Findings: Germany 
The main results of the German sample are shown in Table 3. Standard errors are 
clustered at the investor home country. In line with our hypothesis, Model 1 shows that fully 
U.S.-owned subsidiaries have a statistically significant 1.2 percentage point higher tax rate than 
subsidiaries from countries with a territorial system.11 In Model 2 we control for other 
                                                          
11 Germany exhibited a corporate income tax rate cut of 10 percentage points in 2008 which we control for by using 
year fixed effects. Furthermore, we control for differences between legal forms because our sample of foreign-
owned subsidiaries consists of Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) – which are comparable to S 
corporations, and Aktiengesellschaften (AG) – which are comparable to C corporations. Both legal forms, however, 
entail limited liability.  
14 
 
determinants of tax aggressiveness and we include NON_EU which is coded one if the investor is 
located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. As U.S.-owned subsidiaries form part of the 
non-EU countries, the coefficient of US100 can now be interpreted as the additional effect of the 
U.S. investor over and above the average effect of all non-EU countries. Thereby, we rule out 
that our results are driven by geographical distance or institutional knowledge assuming that 
investors from other non-EU countries have a similar knowledge of the German tax system.  
The coefficient of 0.012 means that U.S.-owned subsidiaries pay 1.2 Euro-Cent (€0.012) 
more taxes on each Euro earned compared to other non-German subsidiaries. To give an 
economic magnitude, we calculate the reduction in return on equity due to the reduced tax 
aggressiveness of wholly U.S.-owned subsidiaries. We divide the “excess” tax payments of 
wholly U.S.-owned subsidiaries by the level of equity of these subsidiaries. Neglecting potential 
costs of tax planning, U.S.-owned subsidiaries lose, on average, 0.5 percentage points return on 
equity (ROE) per annum.  
 Insert Table 3 here  
Models 3 and 4 contain cross-sectional tests. In Model 3 we include an indicator variable 
IMM that is coded one when the ultimate and immediate owner are located in the same country, 
and zero otherwise.12 Foreign investors with a less complex group structure abroad might have 
fewer investment and refinancing opportunities, and are thus more likely to repatriate in a timely 
manner. Thus, it is less likely that these firms will wait for a tax holiday to avoid repatriation 
taxes, and that these subsidiaries will have a reduced incentive to be tax aggressive abroad. We 
                                                          
12 Unfortunately, we do not observe the full group structure. However, for approximately half of our observations we 
can control for whether the immediate owner is located in the same country as the ultimate owner. We have a 
subgroup of 257 U.S. subsidiaries where the ultimate owner and the immediate owner are incorporated in the United 
States. 
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expect and find higher ETRs within this subgroup where the immediate owner is located in the 
same country as the ultimate owner (see interaction US100 * IMM).  
In Model 4, we include the variable DIV. The incentive of foreign subsidiaries to be less 
tax aggressive exists only if the subsidiaries actually pay out dividends. DIV is defined as the 
ratio of dividends to net income. We do not observe actual dividend payments, but we compute 
dividends as the net income of the current year minus the change in equity of the following year. 
This procedure reduces the sample size to 2,325 firm-year observations. Subsidiaries that pay 
dividends have a reduced incentive to avoid taxes because it is less likely that they will wait for a 
tax holiday. The interaction of US100 and DIV has the expected sign, but the significance level is 
only close to conventional levels (P-Value: 0.148). 
In Model 5, we match each U.S.-owned subsidiary based on all covariates with a 
subsidiary owned by investors from a country with a territorial system. Thus, we compare 
subsidiaries that are similar across all covariates and their only difference is the parent 
company’s home country.13 The matching algorithm reduces the sample to 361 U.S. firm-year 
observations and 361 control firms. Non-tabulated t-tests show that there are no statistical 
differences between the two groups. The findings are in line with the previous models.14 Overall, 
the results of Table 3 show that U.S.-owned subsidiaries have a higher tax rate than subsidiaries 
that are owned by investors from countries with a territorial system. 
                                                          
13 We match without replacement and use a caliper of 5 percentage points for continuous variables and an exact 
matching for indicator variables. We find similar results if we use a propensity score matching design where the first 
stage models the likelihood of being a U.S. parent.   
14 We do not match the dependent variable, but match U.S. and non U.S. subsidiaries based on all covariates. Thus, 
the covariates still have variation and explanatory power for the dependent variable (for example, if profitability is 
negatively associated with the ETR in both the treatment and control groups). 
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Influence of the Parent 
Parent company characteristics (e.g. firm size) may influence tax aggressiveness of 
subsidiaries abroad. Therefore, we use the shareholder identification number to include those 
characteristics. We obtain this information for 1,809 firm-year observations. Model 1 of Table 4 
includes US100 and tests whether U.S.-owned subsidiaries are less tax aggressive. We further 
control for the characteristics of the subsidiaries (“Sub Control: Yes”), and the displayed control 
variables are based on the parent companies, denoted by the subscript “p”. Model 2 furthermore 
includes industry, legal form, and year fixed effects. The results show that the characteristics of 
the parent companies have only limited explanatory power, and the coefficient of US100 remains 
positive and significant in all specifications.  
Insert Table 4 here 
4 European Sample 
Sample and Research Design 
We extend our analyses to other European countries. The time frame is in line with the 
German analysis (2005 to 2009). We limit the European sample to those countries where we 
have sufficient firm-level and shareholder data. This provides us with 85,348 firm-year 
observations for 11 countries. Similar to the German setting, we use unconsolidated financial 
statements in our European sample, as in Europe taxation is usually tied to unconsolidated 
financial statements. The sample includes only wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries in the 
respective countries.  
Panel A of Table 5 reports summary statistics for the variables of the European sample. 
ROA and SIZE (measured as log of total assets) show a mean of 0.094 and 15.889, respectively. 
This indicates that foreign subsidiaries in all European countries of our sample are about as 
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profitable as the German subsidiaries, but smaller. Similar to Table 1, Panel B and Panel C of 
Table 5 show that U.S.-owned subsidiaries have a higher average tax rate compared to the 
control sample (33.4% vs. 32.4%). Panel D of Table 5 reports the statutory corporate income tax 
rate plus regionally invariant surcharges and withholding taxes (column STR), and effective tax 
rates for the European sample. It shows that Belgium, France, Norway, and Spain have a 
statutory total tax burden exceeding the U.S. statutory tax rate of 35%.15  
We observe an unusually high effective tax rate for Italy of 50.1%, while the statutory tax 
rate in Italy amounted to 33% from 2005 to 2007 and was reduced as from 2008 to 27.5%. 
Adding withholding taxes, the total tax burden amounts to 31.1%. This is significantly lower than 
the effective tax rate of 50.1% because Italian firms classify social security costs paid by the firm 
as income taxes. Thus, the effective tax rate of 50.1% is overstated and the real tax burden is 
below the U.S. 35% statutory tax rate.  
Insert Table 5 here 
Findings: Less than 35% 
Next, we repeat our analysis in different European countries. We split the countries for 
this analysis based on whether the statutory tax burden exceeds 35%. For countries with a total 
tax burden below 35% (domestic tax plus withholding tax according to income tax treaties), we 
expect to find the same results as in the German sample. The regression design is the same as in 
Equation 5. Due to limited data availability, we control for only ROA and SIZE.16 ROA is defined 
as pretax book income over total assets, and SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of total 
                                                          
15 Countries with insufficient data on either financial statements or shareholder data are dropped (e.g. for the 
Netherlands, we observe only 40 firm-year observations with foreign shareholders). 
16 In the European sample, we find similar effects for German firms as in the German sample with all controls. Thus, 
we are confident that controlling for only ROA and SIZE does not influence the results.  
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assets. Table 6 shows the multivariate regression results for European countries with effective tax 
rates less than 35%. 
Column ALL shows that for these countries the effective tax rate is 2.1 percentage points 
higher if a firm is owned by a U.S. investor. Thus, the effect is stronger compared to the German 
sample. If we test our hypothesis individually for each country, the coefficient for US100 is 
always positive and statistically significant in five out of seven countries. In the remaining two 
countries, the level of significance is only close to conventional levels (P-values for Austria: 
0.155, and Italy: 0.126). The magnitude ranges from 1.9 percentage points (Germany17 and 
Sweden) to 3.6 percentage points (Finland).18  
Insert Table 6 here 
Findings: Greater than 35% 
U.S. multinationals can balance the repatriation tax burden across dividend payments 
from countries with tax rates above and below 35%. If the average effective tax rates of foreign 
subsidiaries exceed the U.S. statutory tax rate of 35%, the U.S. tax authorities grant no credit for 
the taxes paid in excess of 35%. Thus, we do not expect to find the effect documented in the 
previous sections. Conversely, we expect subsidiaries owned by U.S. parent companies to be as 
tax aggressive as subsidiaries owned by non-U.S. investors. Therefore, we repeat our analyses for 
Belgium, France, Norway, and Spain where the statutory tax rate (domestic tax plus withholding 
tax according to double tax treaties) exceeds 35%. While we cannot be certain that the U.S. 
                                                          
17 Using the Orbis data, we have many more observations in Germany compared to the prior analysis. This is 
because we (i) need less information in Table 6 due to the limited control variables and (ii) we do not have to merge 
the data using the German Commercial Register Number. However, the results show that, in this case, the effect 
seems to be stronger (1.9 percentage points). 
18 In Italy, the coefficient of the intercept is relatively high (0.832). This implies that a company would have an 
effective tax rate of 83.2 percent if all other variables were zero. However, the sample is limited to firm-year 
observations with positive pretax income and the coefficient of ROA is highly negative. Furthermore, all other 
coefficients are also negative and the respective variables are non-negative. Thus, all variables have a negative slope, 
and consequently ETRs are lower than 83.2 percent.  
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average foreign tax rate also exceeds 35%, we consider it more likely in this sample for two 
reasons. First, pushing the average tax rate across all countries below 35% is not easy, as many 
developed countries have a corporate income tax rate around 30%. Second, balancing a high 
repatriation tax burden with a low one is allowed only for active income (earned through regular, 
continuous, and substantial operations which are not classified as rental activity), and tax havens 
usually have low economic power to engage in real operations. 
In Table 7 we find a non-significant and slightly negative coefficient across the four 
countries. When testing each country separately, we find non-statistically significant coefficients 
of -0.002 and -0.003 for US100 in Belgium and France, respectively. Thus, in these two countries 
U.S. investors are as tax aggressive as all other investors, indicating that they face an average 
foreign tax rate above 35%. In Norway and Spain, US100 yields a positive parameter estimate of 
0.033 and 0.015, respectively. This indicates that the typical U.S. investor faces an average 
worldwide tax rate below 35%, and being tax aggressive does not pay off. We investigate these 
differences in the next section in more detail. 
Insert Table 7 
Cross-Sectional Tests: Belgium and France 
We conclude in the previous section that U.S. investors in Belgium and France are as tax 
aggressive as all other foreign investors in both countries, based on a null result. To strengthen 
our line of argumentation, we run two additional tests on Belgium and France. First, we limit our 
sample to foreign investors that are shareholders in Belgium or France and in a country with a 
total tax burden below 35%. In this sample (Belgium/France & <35%), we expect U.S. 
shareholders to be less tax aggressive than other foreign shareholders because the weighted 
average foreign tax rate is likely below 35%. Second, we use a sample where foreign 
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shareholders do not have any shareholdings in countries apart from Belgium and France.19 In this 
sample the foreign tax rate is above 35% and we expect U.S. shareholders to be as tax aggressive 
as other foreign shareholders.  
Table 8 reports the results for the common shareholders sample in Model 1 and Model 2 
(Belgium/France & <35%) and the results for the no-common-shareholder sample in Models 3 
and 4 (Belgium/France only). The results are in line with our expectation. Thus, in Model 1 and 
Model 2, U.S. shareholders are less tax aggressive than other foreign shareholders, as indicated 
by positive and statistically significant coefficients of around 0.015. In the second sample where 
foreign shareholders have their only foreign business activities in Belgium or France, U.S. 
shareholders are more tax aggressive than the other shareholders. 
A potential concern of this paper is that less tax aggressive U.S. groups may self-select 
into specific countries. Table 8 addresses this concern. If self-selection were an issue, we would 
observe only one group of subsidiaries in the Belgium/France sample, either less tax aggressive 
subsidiaries or more tax aggressive subsidiaries. However, we find that U.S.-owned subsidiaries 
behave less tax aggressive if their average foreign tax rate is below 35% and more tax aggressive 
if their average foreign tax rate is above 35%. Thus, self-selection is less of a concern. 
Insert Table 8 
Japan and the United Kingdom 
Japan and the United Kingdom had a worldwide tax system in place until 2009. Similar to 
U.S.-owned subsidiaries, we compare U.K.- and Japanese-owned subsidiaries to other foreign-
owned subsidiaries in jurisdictions where the average effective tax rates are below and above the 
                                                          
19 This is based on our sample of European shareholdings. We cannot rule out that these groups have active income 
in other low-tax countries. However, it is at least more likely that, based on the mentioned sample split, these firms 
have higher foreign average tax rates. 
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Japanese and U.K. statutory tax rates, respectively.20 Thus, we expect to find that U.K. and 
Japanese subsidiaries are less tax aggressive in countries where the average ETR is below the 
Japanese and U.K. statutory tax rates, and no effect in countries where the average ETR is above. 
The statutory tax rate between 2005 and 2009 was 42% in Japan and 30% in the United 
Kingdom. Therefore, we first test whether subsidiaries owned by investors from the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Japan are less tax aggressive than subsidiaries owned by 
investors from other countries in a sample of countries with a statutory tax rate below 30%. This 
test is similar to Table 7, with the exception that observations from Germany (average STR 
33.3%) and Italy (average STR 31.1%) are not included. The first column of Table 9 shows that 
subsidiaries owned by U.K. and Japanese investors are statistically significantly less tax 
aggressive. While the economic magnitude is very high for Japanese subsidiaries (4.7 percentage 
points), it is much lower for U.K. subsidiaries (0.3 percentage points).  
Column 2 of Table 9 (> 35%) shows that subsidiaries owned by U.K. investors are not 
less tax aggressive when the statutory tax rate is above 35%. In this case, these subsidiaries have 
the same incentive to be tax aggressive. We could not conduct this test for Japanese-owned 
subsidiaries, as only Belgium has a higher tax rate than Japan and we observe only 26 Japanese-
owned subsidiaries in Belgium. Overall, using U.K.- and Japanese-owned subsidiaries as 
treatment countries corroborates our finding that multinationals from countries with worldwide 
tax regimes are less tax aggressive in their foreign subsidiaries.  
Insert Table 9 
                                                          
20 Ideally, we could do a pre-post comparison (difference-in-difference design). However, we do not have sufficient 
ownership data available for U.K. and Japanese firms after 2009. 
22 
 
5 Robustness Tests and Further Results 
Different Thresholds 
In Table 10 we repeat our analyses from Table 3 (German sample) with five different 
thresholds (0, 25, 50, 75, and 100% U.S. ownership). The first threshold is US0 which equals one 
if the respective firm has at least one U.S. investor, and zero otherwise. If investors hold more 
than 25%, they can prevent other investors from changing the bylaws or liquidating the firm. 
US25 equals one if more than 25% of the investors are from the United States, and zero 
otherwise. If investors hold more than 50% of the votes, they can determine the strategy of the 
firm, as they hold a majority in the supervisory board. US50 equals one if more than 50% of the 
investors are from the United States, and zero otherwise. If investors control at least 75% of the 
votes, they are able to change the bylaws (§ 262 Abs. 1 Nr. 2 AktG) or even liquidate the 
respective company (§ 179 Abs. 2 AktG). US75 equals one if at least 75% of the investors are 
from the United States, and zero otherwise. Lastly, US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned 
by a U.S. investor, and zero otherwise. 
The control sample is defined accordingly. For example, when we investigate firms with 
more than 25% U.S. investors, the control sample consists of firms that have at least 25% 
investors from one other non-German country. The results are statistically significant across all 
models. As one would expect, the coefficient increases with the degree of U.S. investors. 
Insert Table 10 here 
Long-Run ETR 
Our sample does not contain subsidiaries with negative pretax income. This sample 
selection could potentially affect our results. As tax rates of firm-years with negative pretax 
income are not meaningful, we cannot simply include them in our sample. However, we can 
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compute long-run effective tax rates over several years and exclude only those subsidiaries where 
the sum of the pretax income is negative. This has several advantages. First, the sample selection 
problem is reduced, as we are able to include firm-years with negative pretax income. Second, 
this approach reduces the problem of tax loss offsetting. And third, Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
Maydew (2008) show that annual tax rates are not necessarily predictive of the long-run tax 
avoidance strategy.  
In Table 11 (German sample), we include subsidiaries with at least 3 years of 
observations, instead of including every subsidiary with at least 1 year of data. The dependent 
variable is the average tax rate, and – in line with Gallemore and Labro (2015) – we compute our 
control variables as averages over time. In Model 1, we include the main variable of interest, 
US100, and fixed effects, and find a significantly positive coefficient of 0.016. When including 
further controls, the coefficient increases to 0.026. Thus, we still find that U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries are less tax aggressive. 
Insert Table 11 here 
Tax Loss Carryforwards 
In our multivariate regressions, we do not control for the existence of tax loss 
carryforwards (TLCFs), as firms are not required to publish their amount of TLCF. This could 
potentially influence our results if U.S.-owned subsidiaries were more profitable and would thus 
show less TLCFs than non-U.S.-owned subsidiaries. We address this concern by limiting our 
sample to subsidiaries with more than one consecutive year of positive pretax income, and then 
delete the first observation of each firm. Such a reduced sample is less prone to the influence of 
TLCF, as firms would offset (at least partly) TLCFs in the first profitable year after the tax loss. 
For the reduced sample, we find that U.S.-owned subsidiaries have higher ETRs than the control 
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sample (Table 12, German sample). The effect is even greater than in our main analysis in Table 
3. Thus, we conclude that differences in the profitability of subsidiaries and the existence of 
TLCFs do not explain our findings.   
Insert Table 12 here 
United States versus Canada 
So far, we include a non-EU dummy to rule out that our results are driven by 
geographical distance or institutional knowledge about a country’s tax system. However, 
compared to other non-EU countries, the U.S. culture is close to that of Europe. To rule out that 
our results are driven by geographical or cultural differences between the investors’ home 
countries, we compare U.S.-owned subsidiaries with Canadian-owned subsidiaries.21 Table 13 
shows that U.S.-owned subsidiaries have a more than 2.7 percentage points higher tax rate 
compared to Canadian-owned subsidiaries. However, this results should be interpreted with 
caution, as the sample contains only 62 Canadian firm-year observations (35 different 
subsidiaries). 
Insert Table 13 here 
6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of a worldwide tax system at the level of a parent 
company on the tax aggressiveness of its subsidiaries abroad. We find that subsidiaries owned by 
U.S. investors show a by 1.2 percentage point higher ETR compared to subsidiaries owned by 
investors from a country with a territorial tax system. We argue that this is due to the high U.S. 
tax rate that is levied on dividend distributions of a subsidiary when profits are repatriated.  
                                                          
21 We are aware that the Canadian culture is not the same as the U.S. culture. However, we believe that the Canadian 
culture is the closest one.  
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An alternative explanation for our findings could be cultural differences across countries, 
such as reputational concern. However, we are not aware why especially U.S. investors should 
face higher reputational costs than other investors.22 In a similar vein, the costs associated with 
tax avoidance should also be constant across foreign investors, as all foreign investors face the 
same litigation risk in the foreign jurisdiction in case of tax fraud. Nevertheless, geographical 
distance or similarity in the tax systems could have an effect on the costs of tax avoidance. We 
rule this out by testing the incremental effect of U.S.-owned subsidiaries over and above other 
non-EU countries, and comparing U.S.-owned subsidiaries with Canadian-owned subsidiaries. 
The variable for being U.S. owned remains qualitatively the same and statistically significant.   
Our study contributes to the existing literature by showing why U.S. multinationals are 
less tax aggressive in their foreign subsidiaries. Markle (2016) documents that parent companies 
in countries which apply a worldwide tax system, shift less income across jurisdictions into their 
foreign subsidiaries than parent companies in countries that apply a territorial tax system. 
Furthermore, we document that subsidiaries owned by investors from country that applies a 
worldwide tax system have no incentive to take aggressive tax positions in foreign jurisdictions 
when the domestic tax rate does not exceed the U.S. statutory tax rate. Taxing multinationals 
based on their worldwide profits leads to a reduction in profitability of their foreign subsidiaries, 
and can lead to a wealth transfer from the residence state of the parent to the residence state of 
the subsidiary. This wealth transfer takes place at the cost of the parent’s shareholders, who 
receive a lower after-tax return.  
  
                                                          
22 Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock (2014) do not find a reputational effect of U.S. firms that engage in tax 
sheltering. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Germany 
Panel A: Full Sample        
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
US100 4,199 0.128 0.334 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ETR 4,199 0.310 0.149 0.003 0.238 0.317 0.391 0.814 
ROA 4,199 0.096 0.091 0.000 0.031 0.069 0.131 0.464 
DEBT 4,199 0.590 0.242 0.025 0.426 0.606 0.771 1.136 
PPE 4,199 0.160 0.210 0.000 0.013 0.066 0.234 0.918 
INTANG 4,199 0.019 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.384 
SIZE 4,199 16.809 1.592 11.285 15.880 16.729 17.695 21.349 
BIG5 4,199 0.201 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
        
Panel B: US100 = 0        
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETR 3,662 0.308 0.149 0.003 0.233 0.317 0.391 0.814 
ROA 3,662 0.095 0.091 0.000 0.031 0.067 0.130 0.464 
DEBT 3,662 0.599 0.238 0.025 0.441 0.615 0.775 1.136 
PPE 3,662 0.162 0.211 0.000 0.012 0.067 0.238 0.918 
INTANG 3,662 0.020 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.008 0.384 
SIZE 3,662 16.809 1.627 11.285 15.882 16.729 17.704 21.349 
BIG5 3,662 0.206 0.404 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
        
Panel C: US100 = 1        
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETR 537 0.317 0.149 0.003 0.263 0.314 0.390 0.464 
ROA 537 0.101 0.088 0.000 0.036 0.081 0.136 1.136 
DEBT 537 0.528 0.259 0.025 0.323 0.525 0.728 0.918 
PPE 537 0.148 0.199 0.000 0.017 0.062 0.190 0.384 
INTANG 537 0.016 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 21.349 
SIZE 537 16.805 1.336 11.285 15.871 16.729 17.627 1.000 
BIG5 537 0.168 0.374 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the German sample. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned 
by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. ETR is the effective tax rate and calculated as total tax expense (including 
deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG 
are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is 
coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, 
KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  
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Table 2: Pearson and Spearman Correlations Germany 
Variable   ETR DEBT INTANG BIG5 
  US100 ROA PPE SIZE 
US100  0.02 0.02 -0.10*** -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.03** 
ETR 0.01  -0.17*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.05*** -0.02 0.01 
ROA 0.04** -0.18***  -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.13*** -0.06*** 
DEBT -0.10*** 0.05*** -0.35***  -0.12*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.01 
PPE 0.00 -0.05*** 0.05*** -0.11***  -0.05*** 0.09*** -0.03* 
INTANG 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.17***  0.04*** -0.03 
SIZE 0.00 -0.04** -0.14*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.07***  0.47*** 
BIG5 -0.03** 0.00 -0.05*** 0.01 0.01 0.08*** 0.48***   
This table provides Spearman correlations below the diagonal and Pearson correlations above the diagonal. US100 
equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. ETR is the effective tax rate and 
calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. ROA is pretax income divided by 
total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the 
logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the top auditors in Germany 
(BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* mark 
significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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Table 3: Regressions - Germany 
ETR Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
   IMM DIV Match 
Constant 0.330*** 0.427*** 0.424*** 0.354*** 0.311*** 
  (0.019) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.061) 
US100 0.012*** 0.012* -0.007 0.029*** 0.028* 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.016) 
PARTITION     0.007* 0.029***  
(IMM or DIV)     (0.004) (0.008)  
US * PARTITION     0.037*** 0.006  
     (0.004) (0.004)  
NON_EU   0.000 0.000 -0.017** 0.037** 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.018) 
ROA   -0.286*** -0.287*** -0.250*** -0.272** 
    (0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.113) 
DEBT   -0.025** -0.024** 0.012 -0.052** 
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.022) 
PPE   -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.057*** -0.080** 
    (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.030) 
INTANG   0.119 0.118 0.115 0.343*** 
    (0.076) (0.075) (0.089) (0.108) 
SIZE   -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.003 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
BIG5   0.009 0.008 -0.014* 0.040*** 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Legal Form FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.040 0.073 0.076 0.084 0.138 
N 4199 4199 4199 2325 722 
This table shows OLS regression results. The dependent variable is ETR which is the effective tax rate. It is calculated 
as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. In Model 3, the conditioning variable 
(PARTITION) is IMM and in Model 4 it is DIV. IMM is a dummy variable which is coded one if the ultimate owner is 
equal to the immediate owner. DIV is the ratio of dividends to net income. Model 5 contains the results of a matched 
subsample. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded 
one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total 
assets. DEBT, PPE and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm 
of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the top auditors in Germany (BDO, 
Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are 
clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* 
marks significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
 
  
32 
 
Table 4: Regressions - Germany, Parent Controls 
ETR Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.316*** 0.446*** 
  (0.033) (0.046) 
US100 0.028*** 0.035*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
ETRp 0.006 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.010) 
ROAp 0.079* 0.059 
  (0.039) (0.044) 
LOSSp 0.001 0.002 
  (0.012) (0.013) 
DEBTp 0.017 0.014 
  (0.017) (0.019) 
PPEp -0.007 -0.003 
  (0.018) (0.018) 
INTANGp -0.056* -0.049 
  (0.031) (0.032) 
SIZEp 0.001 0.000 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Subsidiary Controls Yes Yes 
Time FE (of subsidiary) No Yes 
Legal Form FE (of subsidiary) No Yes 
Industry FE (of subsidiary) No Yes 
R-squared 0.055 0.080 
N 1809 1809 
This table shows OLS regression results where the control variables are based on data of the parent company. The 
dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) 
divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. All 
control variables are based on the parent of the respective subsidiary. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. 
DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of 
total assets. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the 
home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance 
at the 1/5/10% level.  
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics – Europe 
Panel A: Full Sample        
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
US100 85,348 0.046 0.209 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ETR 85,348 0.325 0.194 0.003 0.213 0.313 0.401 0.953 
ROA 85,348 0.094 0.105 0.000 0.024 0.060 0.124 0.581 
SIZE 85,348 15.889 2.011 10.859 14.638 15.935 17.132 21.577 
         
Panel B: US100 = 0        
Variable N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETR 81,451 0.324 0.194 0.003 0.211 0.312 0.401 0.953 
ROA 81,451 0.094 0.105 0.000 0.024 0.060 0.124 0.581 
SIZE 81,451 15.871 2.018 10.859 14.619 15.921 17.115 21.577 
         
Panel C: US100 = 1        
  N Mean Sd Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
ETR 3,897 0.334 0.185 0.003 0.252 0.330 0.407 0.953 
ROA 3,897 0.099 0.099 0.000 0.033 0.071 0.128 0.581 
SIZE 3,897 9.358 1.816 10.859 15.052 16.236 17.392 21.577 
         
Panel D: Tax Rates by Country       
STR < 0.35 N ETR STR STR > 0.35 N ETR STR 
Austria 835 0.221 0.288 Belgium 3,694 0.321 0.439 
Denmark 3,656 0.269 0.288 France 20,790 0.363 0.366 
Finland 1,986 0.306 0.297 Norway  4,193 0.295 0.352 
Germany 37,657 0.306 0.333 Spain 5,596 0.301 0.370 
Ireland 618 0.164 0.169        
Italy 3,797 0.501 0.311      
Sweden 2,526 0.290 0.263        
Sum 51,075     Sum   34,273     
Panel A of this table provides descriptive statistics of the European sample. Panels B and C report descriptive statistics 
split along U.S. ownership (US100=1). US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero 
otherwise. ETR is the effective tax rate and calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax 
income. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Panel D divides the sample 
into countries where the statutory tax burden computed as corporate income tax plus withholding tax on dividend 
distributions (column STR) is below (exceeds) 35%.  
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Table 6: Regressions – Europe per Country, ETR < 35% 
ETR ALL Austria Denmark Finland Germany Ireland Italy Sweden 
Constant 0.352*** 0.175*** 0.429*** 0.275*** 0.422*** 0.238*** 0.831*** 0.451*** 
  (0.008) (0.036) (0.015) (0.032) (0.399) (0.024) (0.019) (0.021) 
US100 0.021*** 0.036 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.019** 0.039** 0.034 0.019*** 
  (0.005) (0.025) (0.005) (0.008) (0.013) (0.018) (0.022) (0.006) 
NON_EU -0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.056*** 0.001 -0.028 0.001 0.008 
  (0.005) (0.026) (0.006) (0.011) -(0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.007) 
ROA -0.490*** -0.142* -0.261*** -0.381*** -0.511*** -0.208*** -1.160*** -0.361*** 
  (0.030) (0.072) (0.015) (0.041) -(0.291) (0.050) (0.057) (0.038) 
Size -0.007*** 0.006 -0.010*** 0.010*** -0.006*** -0.006** -0.024*** -0.012*** 
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) -(0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No No No No No No No 
R-squared 0.146 0.025 0.093 0.107 0.070 0.106 0.246 0.123 
N 51,075 835 3,656 1,986 37,657 618 3,797 2,526 
N, US = 1 1,492 42 297 71 792 33 176 81 
N, US = 0 49,583 793 3,359 1,915 36,865 585 3,621 2,445 
This table shows OLS regression results for European countries in which the tax rate is below 35% (domestic tax plus withholding tax according to income tax 
treaties). The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. 
NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm 
of total assets. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. All non-dichotomous 
data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
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Table 7: Regressions – Europe per Country, ETR > 35% 
ETR ALL Belgium France Norway Spain 
Constant 0.423*** 0.596*** 0.453*** 0.348*** 0.368*** 
  (0.013) (0.025) (0.013) (0.026) (0.016) 
US100 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 0.033*** 0.015 
  (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) 
NON_EU -0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.011 -0.016 
  (0.010) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) 
ROA -0.459*** -0.338*** -0.631*** -0.196*** -0.242*** 
  (0.034) (0.040) (0.031) (0.024) (0.019) 
Size -0.006*** -0.024*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes No No No No 
R-squared 0.093 0.099 0.090 0.068 0.054 
N 34,273 3,694 20,790 4,193 5,596 
N, US = 1 2,405 143 1,740 149 373 
N, US = 0 31,868 3,551 19,050 4,044 5,223 
This table shows OLS regression results for European countries in which the tax rate is above 35% (domestic tax plus withholding tax according to income tax 
treaties). The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. It is calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. 
ETR is the effective tax rate and calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned 
by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income 
divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets 
below the coefficients. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level.   
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Table 8: Regressions – Belgium and France 
 Belgium/France & <35% Belgium/France only 
ETR Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.377*** 0.534*** 0.364*** 0.475*** 
  (0.020) (0.028) (0.007) (0.018) 
US100 0.011 0.016*** -0.018*** -0.010*** 
  (0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA   -0.585***   -0.591*** 
    (0.051)   (0.036) 
SIZE   -0.012***   -0.008*** 
   (0.003)   (0.002) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.010 0.091 0.007 0.088 
N 6,860 6,860 17,624 17,624 
N, US = 1 6,530 6,530 16,071 16,071 
N, US = 0 330 330 1,553 1,553 
This table shows OLS regression results for Belgium and France. The sample in Model 1 and Model 2 is limited to shareholders that have at least one observation 
in Belgium/France and one in the <35% sample. Conversely, Model 3 and Model 4 are limited to shareholders that have at least one observation in 
Belgium/France, but no observations in the <35% sample. The dependent variable in Model 1 through Model 6 is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. It is 
calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero 
otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 
1/5/10% level.  
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Table 9: Regressions – Japan and United Kingdom 
 ETR STR< 30% STR> 35% 
Constant 0.318*** 0.423*** 
  (0.017) (0.013) 
US_100 0.025*** -0.002 
  (0.003) (0.009) 
GB_100 0.003** 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
JP_100 0.047***  
 (0.004)  
NON_EU -0.008** -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.010) 
ROA -0.303*** -0.459*** 
  (0.016) (0.034) 
SIZE -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.139 0.093 
N 9,621 34,273 
This table shows OLS regression results for Japan and the United Kingdom. The dependent variable is ETR, which is 
the effective tax rate. It is calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 
equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. GB100 equals one if the firm is 
wholly-owned by investors from the United Kingdom, and zero otherwise. JP100 equals one if the firm is wholly-
owned by Japanese investors, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the 
logarithm of total assets. All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are 
clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* 
marks significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
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Table 10: Regressions – Different Thresholds 
ETR US0 US25 US50 US75 US100 
Constant 0.412*** 0.386*** 0.392*** 0.402*** 0.427*** 
  (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.032) 
USX 0.006** 0.006** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA -0.254*** -0.254*** -0.250*** -0.256*** -0.285*** 
  (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) 
DEBT -0.016** -0.022** -0.025*** -0.022** -0.025** 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
PPE -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.045*** -0.044*** 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
INTANG 0.074 0.086 0.109* 0.119 0.119 
  (0.058) (0.062) (0.064) (0.072) (0.075) 
SIZE -0.004** -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
BIG5 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.009 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Legal Form FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.063 0.069 0.068 0.068 0.073 
N 6,038 5,245 5,179 4,648 4,199 
N, US = 1 740 671 624 592 537 
N, US = 0 5,298 4,574 4,555 4,056 3,662 
This table shows OLS regression results for the German sample. The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective 
tax rate. It is calculated as total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if 
the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. US75 equals one if at least 75% of the investors are 
from the United States, and zero otherwise. US50 equals one if more than 50% of the investors are from the United 
States, and zero otherwise. US25 equals one if more than 25% of the investors are from the United States, and zero 
otherwise. US0 equals one if the respective firm has at least one U.S. investor, and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax 
income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible assets deflated by total 
assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is audited by one of the top 
auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided within the brackets below the 
coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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Table 11: Regressions – Long-Run ETR 
Long-run ETR Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.349*** 0.397*** 
  (0.024) (0.050) 
US100 0.016*** 0.026*** 
  (0.005) (0.009) 
NON_EU   -0.010 
   (0.009) 
mean(ROA)   -0.146*** 
    (0.047) 
mean(DEBT)   0.028* 
    (0.014) 
mean(PPE)   -0.037* 
    (0.021) 
mean(INTANG)   0.168* 
    (0.087) 
mean(SIZE)   -0.003 
    (0.003) 
mean(BIG5)   -0.005 
    (0.011) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Legal Form FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.054 0.090 
N 575 575 
N, US = 1 74 74 
N, US = 0 501 501 
This table shows OLS regression results for the German sample. In contrast to all other tables, firm-years with 
negative pretax income are not deleted. The sample includes only subsidiaries with more than two firm-year 
observations. All variables are calculated as the mean of all observations per firm over the sample period. 
Subsidiaries with a negative average pretax income are deleted from the sample. The independent variable is the 
long-run ETR, which is the average of tax payments summed over all firm-years per firm, divided by sum of pretax 
income summed up over all firm-years per firm. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. investors, 
and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero 
otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and 
intangible assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective 
company is audited by one of the top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous 
data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and 
are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level.  
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Table 12: Regressions – TAXRATE, controlling for TLCF 
ETR Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.320*** 0.382*** 
  (0.025) (0.044) 
US100 0.014*** 0.020*** 
  (0.004) (0.007) 
NON_EU   -0.006 
   (0.008) 
ROA   -0.267*** 
    (0.040) 
DEBT   0.012 
    (0.013) 
PPE   -0.051*** 
    (0.016) 
INTANG   0.120 
    (0.079) 
SIZE   -0.002 
    (0.003) 
BIG5   0.000 
    (0.006) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Legal Form FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.063 0.103 
N 2195 2195 
N, US = 1 291 291 
N, US = 0 1,904 1,904 
This table shows OLS regression results. The sample includes only subsidiaries with more than one observation; the 
first observation is deleted. The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. It is calculated as total tax 
expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned by U.S. 
investors, and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, and zero 
otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. DEBT, PPE, and INTANG are total debt, PPE, and intangible 
assets deflated by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. BIG5 is coded one if the respective company is 
audited by one of the top auditors in Germany (BDO, Deloitte, EY, KPMG, PwC). All non-dichotomous data are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the investor and are provided 
within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
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Table 13: Regressions – United States vs. Canada 
ETR Model 1 Model 2 
Constant 0.263*** 0.375*** 
  (0.002) (0.000) 
US100 0.018** 0.027** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA   -0.457*** 
    (0.015) 
SIZE   -0.008*** 
   (0.000) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.179 0.243 
N 1,554 1,554 
N, US = 1 1,492 1,492 
N, US = 0 62 62 
This table shows OLS regression results for European countries in which ETR is below 35%. The sample is limited 
to U.S. and Canadian shareholders. The dependent variable is ETR, which is the effective tax rate. It is calculated as 
total tax expense (including deferred taxes) divided by pretax income. US100 equals one if the firm is wholly-owned 
by U.S. investors, and zero otherwise. NON_EU is coded one if the parent company is located in a non-EU country, 
and zero otherwise. ROA is pretax income divided by total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. All non-
dichotomous data are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Standard errors are clustered at the home country of the 
investor and are provided within the brackets below the coefficients. ***/**/* marks significance at the 1/5/10% 
level 
 
